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Law and Politics in Judicial Oversightof Federal
AdministrativeAgencies

MarthaAnne Humphries
Donald R. Songer
University of South Carolina
Administrativeagencies play a substantialrole in the formulationand implementationof national
policy. Centralto this role is their exercise of discretion.A normativeconsensus exists that such discretion should be constrainedby administrativedeference to the rule of law. The courts of appeals
are expected to insure that such discretionis constrained.The analysis reportedbelow examines how
effectively they fulfill that expectation.The findings suggest that agency success is related to political considerations,with agencies being successful when their decisions are consistent with the policy
preferencesof the judges. However,variablesthat capturedelements of the legal model were also related to success. Takentogether,it appearsthat the appeals courts respondto both legal concerns and
political preferences.Thus, the courts appear to fulfill the expectation that they will constrain the
worst abuses of discretionby imposing the rule of law.

F
or decades studentsof politics in the United States have recognized that administrativeagencies are importantpolitical actors that play a substantialrole in
the formulation as well as the implementation of national policy. As Peters
(1989) notes, federal administrativeagencies are "majorformulators"of policy.
Centralto their role as policymakersis the extensive discretionexercised by administrativeagencies (Horowitz 1994). While there is widespreadacceptance of
the necessity for administrativediscretion, a normative consensus exists that
such discretion should be constrainedby administrativedeference to the policy
preferencesof the presidentand Congress in additionto the substantiveand procedural requirementsof the rule of law. It is well known, however, that neither
subservienceto political superiorsnor fidelity to the rule of law can be assumed
to characterize all administrativeaction. Anecdotal evidence abounds of the
abuse of discretionthat results in the interjectionof personal favoritismor polit-

ical bias into administrative decisions. "Discretion has its dark side . . . [it]

enables and even invites officials to overreach, to discriminate invidiously, to
subordinatepublic interests to private ones . . . and to tyrannize over the citizenry" (Schuck 1994, 155). As a result, control of administrativediscretionhas
been a "centralproblem"for decades of both theorists and practitionersof politics in the United States (Horowitz 1994).
THEJOURNALOF POLITICS,
Vol.61, No. 1, February1999, Pp. 207-20
? 1999 by the Universityof Texas Press, P.O.Box 7819, Austin,TX 78713-7819

208

MarthaAnne Humphriesand Donald R. Songer

This concern has led to substantialagreementthat there must be some legal
restraintson the exercise of administrativediscretion (Peters 1989). The "traditional form" of such attempts to provide legal control on administrative
discretion "has been review by more or less independenttribunals of various
kinds, principallygeneralist article III courts" (Schuck 1994, 156). In this context, judicial review is seen as a "check on lawlessness, a check on
administrativeagents making choices based on convenientpersonal or political
preferences without substantialconcern for matters of inconvenientprinciple"
(Robinson 1991, 181).
A corollaryof the expectationthat courts will implementa legal check on the
abuse of discretionby agencies is the assumptionthat courts, especially the federal appellatecourts, will faithfully apply the law ratherthan their own political
attitudeswhen they review agency decisions. Otherwise, instead of a check that
imposes the rule of law,judicial review will merely result in the substitutionof
the private preferences of one set of actors for those of another.The present
study explores whether review of agency decisions by the United States Courts
of Appeals is in fact groundedin the rule of law, or is primarilya reflection of
the policy preferencesof the judges.
The courts of appealshave traditionallyplayed a centralrole in the judicial review of agency decisions. This traditional appeals court role of supervising
administrativeagencies has steadily grown in importanceover the last several
decades in response to several environmentalchanges. First,their traditionalrole
of supervising federal regulatoryagencies has grown in importanceas federal
regulationof the economy has become more pervasive.Moreover,as the number
of administrativeappeals adjudicatedin the circuit courts has increaseddramatically, the numberof cases of all types heardby the SupremeCourthas remained
flat (or even slightly declined). Thus, the objective probabilitythat the Supreme
Courtwill review an administrativelaw decision of the courts of appealshas declined sharply.As a result, the courts of appeals have become the final arbiterin
practice for the overwhelmingmajorityof challenges to the decisions of federal
administrativeagencies (Songer 1991). Therefore, if there is to be any legal
check on abuse of discretion by administrativeagencies, the courts of appeals
are likely to have both the first and the final word in the judicial arena.
Existing Research on Administrative Agencies before the Court
Given the appeals courts' significant role in overseeing administrativeagencies, it is surprisingto find very little researchon this topic. Studies aboundon
administrativeagencies before the SupremeCourt,yet similar studies cannotbe
found on the courts of appeals.
Empirical studies of federal administrative agencies before the Supreme
Court,datingback as far as 50 years, show that agencies are one of the most successful litigants with average success rates of at least 70 percent (Canon and
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Giles 1972; Crowley 1987; Handberg1979; Pritchett1948; Sheehan 1990, 1992;
Tanenhaus 1960). Some commentatorssuggest that one key to the success of
agencies in court has been the AdministrativeProcedureAct (Tanenhaus1960).
The AdministrativeProcedureAct (APA) established the "substantialevidence
doctrine,"which mandates that the courts defer to the agency's assessment of
fact providedthere is substantialevidence to supporttheir evaluation(Robinson
1991). These findings suggest that something of a paradoxexists: courts are expected to be a primaryline of defense againstthe abuse of agency discretion,yet
they also are expected to give substantialdeference to the exercise of such discretion.The "arbitraryand capricioustest" and substantialevidence doctrinethat
form the basis of this deference "were built on a fundamentalacceptanceof the
agency as expert, the notion that the agency was the arbiter of an objective,
value-free technical rationality"(Horowitz 1994, 139).
The legal model of court decision making in agency cases suggests that courts
are primarilyconcerned with clear precedentand an agency's adherenceto procedural rules ratherthan with the substantivepolicies produced by the agency
(Crowley 1987; Sheehan 1990). Under a long string of precedents,legal principles like the substantialevidence doctrine and the arbitraryand capricious test
suggest considerablejudicial deference to agency decisions, especially in their
application of statutes to complex factual situations. Such unbiased treatment
should lead to comparablelevels of supportamong all the agencies, regardless
of the agency's political orientation.However,this hypothesis has not been supported in the literature. In a study of administrativeagencies' success rates
before the SupremeCourtfrom 1957 to 1968, Canonand Giles (1972) found the
court was more supportiveof decisions made by certainagencies than by others.
The authorsfound that differencesin agencies' substantivepolicies and goals appearedto play a role in determiningthe Court'ssupportof the agencies. "Inother
words, variancein the Court'swillingness to supportan agency as a recurringlitigant stems largely from the justices' attitudestoward the agency's substantive
policies ratherthan its proceduralbehavior"(Canon and Giles 1972, 190).
Building on Canon and Giles's findings, researchersbegan attemptingto explain why the differences in support of agencies existed. Donald W Crowley
began this endeavor by dividing the agencies into two categories: "old style"
economic agencies and "new style" social agencies (1987). He hypothesizedthat
the SupremeCourtwould supporteconomic agencies at higher rates than social
agencies partiallydue to the ideological battles existing in social regulationlegislation and implementation.Crowley found the Court did support economic
agencies more frequentlythan social agencies, suggesting that it was the justices' policy values rather than legal concerns that determined an agency's
success in court.
In contrastto these studies, some supportfor a legal ratherthan an attitudinal
model of decision making was discoveredby Sheehan (1992), who hypothesized
that a flaw in the past studies was the almost exclusive emphasis on independent
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regulatoryagencies while virtually ignoring the executive agencies. He argued
that an implication of the legal model was that independentregulatoryagencies
would receive greater deference from the Court because they were somewhat
more insulated from the political influence of the executive branch and their
own procedures followed a quasi-judicial format. His research found that the
executive-type agencies fell under much stricterscrutinythan the independenttype agencies. As hypothesized, the Court was more willing to defer to the
independentratherthan the executive agencies (Sheehan 1992). But supportfor
the notion thatjudicial attitudesratherthan legal principles determinedcourt review of agency decisions was enhancedwhen researchersanalyzed whetherthe
directionalityof an agency's decision had an impact on the outcome of the case.
Both Crowley (1987) and Sheehan (1990) found the ideological directionof the
agency's decisions to have a significant influence on the level of deference
grantedby the Court to the agency. The researchersfound that liberal and conservativejudges both tended to shift their supportfor a particularagency based
on the ideological directionof the agency's decision. Similarly,in a study of the
Burger Court from 1969 to 1977, Spaeth and Teger (1982) found that justices
were more likely to defer to probusiness or antilabordecisions of the agencies
than prolaboror antibusiness decisions. These results reinforced the view that
the ideological directionalityof the agency's decision is influentialin explaining
the Supreme Court's differential treatmentof administrativeagencies (Spaeth
and Teger 1982).
In summary,the high rate of success of agencies in the Supreme Court has
been well documented,but we know less aboutthe rate of success of agencies in
the courts of appeals. In an examinationof the effect of litigation resources on
the success of appellantsin the courts of appeals, Songer and Sheehan (1992)
found that the federal government,a category including but not limited to administrativeagencies, had the highest rate of success. A study by Sheehan and
McWilliams (1992) on the circuit courts for 1979, 1983, and 1987 found that
agencies were less successful than in the SupremeCourt, and that there was no
substantialdifference in success rates between the executive and independent
agencies. In Willison's (1986) study of the D.C. circuit from 1981 to 1984, he
finds strong supportfor agencies, althoughthere is considerablevarianceacross
the agencies and judges. He finds that some of the variance is accounted for by
the political environmentof the agency and the backgroundcharacteristicsof the
judges, specifically their party affiliation.
Aside from the exceptions noted above, the research concerning administrative agencies in the federal courts focuses almost exclusively on the Supreme
Court. In addition, the literaturesuggests that the legal model does not explain
the success of agencies in court. Instead,the attitudes of the justices and their
concern with the policy consequences of agency decisions appearto take precedence over the expectationthat the courts will use law to constrainthe discretion
of administrativeagencies.
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A Model of Appeals Court Review of Agency Decisions

Given the paucity of systematicanalysis of judicial review of agency decisions
in the courts of appeals, there is reason to question whether one should assume
thatthe conclusionsbased on SupremeCourtstudies applywith equal force to appeals courtreview.Thereare severalreasonsto suspectthatthe conclusionthatthe
legal model is irrelevantmay not be applicable.First, in other areas of the law
(e.g., civil liberties and criminalprocedure)there is evidence that in the courts of
appealsprecedenthas greaterimpactandthatthe attitudesof thejudges areof less
significance than in the Supreme Court (Howard 1981; Richardsonand Vines
1970; Songer 1982; Songer and Haire 1992; Songer, Segal, and Cameron 1994).
Moreover,none of the examinationsofjudicial review of administrativedecisions
directlytested for influences from the legal model. Instead,in each of the studies
it was inferredthatthe law did not matterbecause evidence was uncoveredthatthe
policy preferencesof the justices were stronglyrelatedto the patternsof support
for the agencies. Thatis, the studies of SupremeCourtreview of agency decisions
generally failed to investigate the possibility of the joint influence of the legal
model andjudicial attitudeson decisions. Finally,the studies of agency review in
the SupremeCourtgenerallyfailed to control for the possibility thatthe attitudes
of the justices would have differentialeffects in relationto differenttypes of issues. The model of judicial review described below is designed to test for the
possibility of thejoint influenceof the legal model andjudicial preferenceson the
likelihoodthatagency decisions will be overturnedby the courtsof appealsunder
controlsfor the types of issues presentin each case.
The test of the prediction derived from the earlier studies (Crowley 1987;
Sheehan 1992; Spaeth and Teger 1982) that agency success in the Supreme
Court was primarilya function of the policy preferences of the justices rather
than any influences associated with the legal model is straightforward.If a similar political model explains agency success in the courts of appeals, then
agencies should be successful when the policy directionof their decision is congruent with the policy preferences of the majority of the reviewing court. To
operationalizethis test, one must create a measureof the ideological directionof
the agency's decision and the ideological preferencesof each court panel. To define the directionalityof the agency's decision, we followed the definitions of
"liberal"and "conservative"most commonly used in empiricalanalyses of lower
federalcourts. Specifically,to createthe variableAgency Direction we employed
the definitionsused by Carpand Rowland(1983)1 in their analysis of federaldistrict decisions (e.g., a liberal decision was defined as one that supported the
government in a challenge to the authorityof the government to regulate the
economy, that favored unions in conflicts against management,that supported
'These definitionsare essentially the same as those used in most studies using the SupremeCourt
Data Base, HaroldJ. Spaeth(PrincipalInvestigator),and are consistentwith the definitionsof liberal
and conservativeadoptedby Crowley (1987) and Sheehan (1990, 1992).

212

MarthaAnne Humphriesand Donald R. Songer

greaterprotectionfor the environmentor consumers in environmentaland consumer protection cases, or supported the person claiming a violation of
constitutionallyprotectedrights in a civil liberties case).
Unfortunately,we do not have direct,independentmeasuresof the ideology of
the hundredsof appeals court and districtcourtjudges who served on the panels
of the courts of appealsthathave reviewedagency decisions over the 20-year period included in this analysis. Nor is it feasible to obtain them. We therefore
adopted an inferentialmeasure of the ideology of each judge based on a linear
combination created by the logistic regression coefficients from a model of
judges' votes in nonconsensualcases. The dependentvariablein this model was
judges' votes in economic cases with 1 = liberalvote and 0 = conservativevote.
The characteristicsof judges that best explained the likelihood of a liberal vote
were the ideology of the appointingpresidentand the region of appointment(a
North/-Southdichotomy)2Specifically, for appointingpresidentwe adopted the
measure created by Tate and Handberg(1991) that scored judges appointedby
liberal ideologically oriented presidents as 1, those appointed by conservative
ideologically oriented presidents as -1, and those appointedby presidentsthat
were not strongly ideological in their appointmentstrategiesas 0. Using the coefficients from this model resulted in the following equation for a measure of
judge ideology:
Judge Ideology = .225 * AppointingPresident + .356 * Region
A measureof the ideology of the appealscourt panel that reviewedthe agency
decision (labeledPanel Ideology) was createdby computingthe meanjudge ideology score of all the judges (including districtjudges and appeals judges on
senior status) who participatedin the panel's decision. To test the predictionsof
the political model, we then computedthe multiplicativeterm Panel Ideology *
Agency Direction. If the political model of decision making is correct, this interactiveterm should be positively relatedto the probabilityof agency success in
the courts of appeals.
A major impedimentto empirical attemptsto assess the impact of the legal
model on appellate court decision making has been the difficulty of identifying
objective indicatorsthat capturethe effects of law and precedent.While a central
featureof the legal model is the expectationthatjudges should follow precedent,
judgments aboutwhethera court in a particularcase actually followed precedent
tend to be highly subjective,typically raising serious questions abouttheir validity and reliability.In this study,the implicationsof legal precedentsare examined
2We tested other measures of state and/or regional influence, specifically including the ADA
scores of the home state senatorsat the time of appointment;the Wright,Erikson, and McIvermeasure of state ideology; and the Berry et al. (1998) dynamic measure of state ideology (for both the
time of appointmentand the time of the judicial decision). However,none of these measures were
statisticallysignificant,nor did they improvethe performanceof the overall model to a statistically
significantdegree.
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to identify the nature of the legal challenges to agency action that may be expected to result in the greatestprobabilityof success for the challengers.Under
a political model, like the realist school of jurisprudence,or the modern-day
Attitudinal Model, the legal basis of the challenge to an agency's decision
should have no impact on the likelihood that the agency will be supported,
since the AttitudinalModel views legal doctrineas "mererationalization"(Segal
and Spaeth 1993).
As noted above, the justification for judicial deference to agency discretion
has traditionallybeen rooted in the view of agencies as the possessors of technical expertise that is superior to the expertise of the courts. As outlined in the
APA, and more specifically in the substantialevidence doctrine,judicial deference toward agencies should be exercised if there is substantial evidence to
support the agency's assessment of facts. To test whether circuit judges were
bound by this legal doctrine,we createda variableSubstantial Evidence, which
was coded "1" if the agency decision was challenged under the substantialevidence doctrine, and "0" if the doctrine was not applied. The legal model leads to

the expectation that because of the expected judicial deference in such cases,
agency success rates should be higher in such cases than in cases based on the
interpretationof statutes.
Alternatively,it is reasonableto believe thatjudges will be least impressedby
an agency claim for deference in cases that involve interpretationof a federal
statute.Interpretationof federal statutesare at the heartof the judicial role. Thus,
the legal model leads to the predictionthat for cases in which the variableFederal Law is coded "1" to indicate the presence of an issue of interpretationof a
federal statute, agencies will have lower rates of success than they will in cases
in which the variableis coded "0" to indicate the absence of such an issue.
The two variablesdescribedabove reflect enduringfeaturesof the legal model
that should have affected appeals court decisions throughoutthe period studied
if there is validity to the legal model. But to adequatelycapturethe effects of the
legal model, one must also model the dynamic element of changing precedent.
Most importantfor a study of the courts of appeals are the changing precedents
announcedby the SupremeCourt.Unfortunately,no quantifiabledirect measure
of changingprecedentis both availableand reliable. However,a rough indicator
of changingprecedentin administrativeagency cases may be obtainedfrom calculating the percentage of liberal and conservative agency rulings that were
affirmedby the Supreme Court. We looked at Supreme Court policymaking in
cases reviewing agency decisions. We ran the analysis separatelyfor four periods, divided by changes in naturalcourts: late WarrenCourt (1962-68 terms),
early BurgerCourt(1969-75 terms), late BurgerCourt(1976-85 terms), and the
RehnquistCourt (to the end of 1989 term). For each period, we calculatedtwo
measures:the percentageof liberal agency decisions that were supportedby the
Court and the percentageof conservativedecisions supportedby the Court.The
measure of SupremeCourt precedentwas conceptualizedas the probabilitythat
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a given agency decision at issue in the courts of appeals would be supportedif
the appeals court decision was reviewed by the Court. For example, if the appeals court was reviewing a conservative agency decision in 1986, the
percentage of conservativeagency decisions supportedby the RehnquistCourt
was our measureof SupremeCourtprecedent.
In summary,three variables were created to capture elements of the legal
model, and predictionswere made about the relationshipsbetween each of these
variablesand agency success. All of these measures are relativelyrough indicators of legal effects, so even their combined effect probablyunderestimatesthe
impact of law and precedent on courts' decisions. Nevertheless, by providing
predictions of the relationshipsthat could be expected to exist if judges in fact
were constrainedby precedent,etc., we may obtain at least a general assessment
of the validity of the legal model. To these measures of the effect of the legal
model, we added one measureof the propensityof judges to supportagency decisions that advancedtheir policy preferences.
Data and Methods
The focus of the present study is the success rates of administrativeagencies
in the U.S. Courts of Appeals from 1969 to 1988.3 Existing research on the
SupremeCourt suggests that administrativeagencies should be one of the more
successful litigants appearingbefore the court. The startingpoint for analysis is
the computation of the overall success rates of the agencies for this 20-year
period.
Once the success rate has been determined,an attemptwill be made to test the
model for predictingagency success describedabove.The dependentvariablefor
this analysis is agency success, which takes the value 1 if the agency position is
supportedby the court and 0 if the agency decision is reversed.Mixed decisions,
where the agency was supportedin partand reversedin part,were excluded from
analysis.
Because least squaresregressionis inappropriatewhen the dependentvariable
is dichotomous(AldrichandNelson 1984), as in the presentanalysis,the parameters of the models were estimatedby logistic regression, a maximum-likelihood
estimation technique. This method produces estimates for the parametersof a
model's independentvariables in terms of the contributioneach makes to the
probabilitythat the dependentvariablefalls into one of the designatedcategories
3Our analysis begins at the beginning of the "judicializationof the administrativeprocess"
(O'Brien 1986, 33) and ends at the end of the Appeals Court database.O'Brien (1986) argues that
beginning in the early 1970s there was diminishedjudicial deference to agency discretion and expertise, and greater judicial policymaking. Melnick (1983) agrees, noting that the early 1970s
ushered in a "new era in administrativelaw" characterizedby more critical judicial overview of
agency action (9). Beginning our analysis in 1969 allows us to test if deference to the agencies and
adherenceto the law was diminishedby attentionto policy preferencesof judges, as proponentsof a
political model would suggest.

Law and Politics in Judicial Oversight

215

(e.g., an agency was supportedor not supported).For each independentvariable,
a maximum-likelihoodestimate(MLE) is calculatedalong with its standarderror
(SE). The MLEs representthe change in the logistic functionthat results from a
one-unitchange in the independentvariable.
The data for this analysis comes from the Appeals CourtData Base.4 Fromthe
database,which includes a stratifiedrandomsample of all publisheddecisions of
the Courts of Appeals from 1925 to 1988, all cases from the last 20 years of the
database(1969-88) where a federal agency is a party,as either an appellantor a
respondent,were examined.The data on the appeals courtjudges and their party
affiliationscomes from the Auburnjudge database.5
Agency Success in the Courts of Appeals
Examinationof Table 1 indicates that federal agencies are successful in the
courts of appeals. Overall, agencies won slightly over three-fifthsof the cases
that reachedthe courts. Since many of their opponentswere repeatplayers with
substantialresources, this success rate is significant. Nevertheless, the rate of
success of agencies in the courts of appeals appears to be substantiallylower
than the success other studies have reported them achieving in the Supreme
Court, and is somewhat lower than the success rate for agencies in the D.C. circuit reportedby Willison (1986).6
Having establishedthat agencies are generally successful, we next turn to our
model of the factors that contributeto that success. The results are presentedin
Table 2. The coefficients in Table 2 show the change in the log of the odds ratio
TABLE1

Success Rate of Federal Administrative Agencies
in the U.S. Courts of Appeals, 1969-1988
Success of agency when appearingas respondent=
Success of agency when appearingas appellant =
Overall success rate =

62.6%
43.4%

(N = 559)
(N = 175)

58.0%

(N = 734)

4The United States Courtsof Appeals Data Base, Donald R. Songer (PrincipalInvestigator),NSF#
SES- 8912678.
5The United States Courtsof Appeals Judge Data Base, Gary Zuk, DeborahJ. Barrow,and Gerard
S. Gryski (Co-PrincipalInvestigators),NSF# SBR-93-11999.
6This aggregate success rate is also substantiallylower than those found by Unah (1997) for the
InternationalTradeCommission and the Departmentof Commercein the FederalCircuit.When we
examined the success rates of agencies individually,we found significantvariationamong agencies.
Several agencies had success rates equal to or greaterthan the aggregatesuccess rate in the Supreme
Court,whereas others, like the NLRB, lost more than half the cases in which they appeared.Further
researchmay explore the agencies individuallyto determine if there are idiosyncraticfactors influencing success.
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TABLE2

A Logistic Regression Model of Federal Agency Success
in the U.S. Courts of Appeals, 1969-1988
MLE

SE

Impacta

-2.000**
0.539**
2.973**
0.025*
0.469**
-0.301*
-0.804

0.623
0.174
0.839
0.011
0.176
0.164
0.435

-.381
.132
.452
.007
.115
-0.75

IndependentVariables
Panel Judge Ideology
Agency Direction
Panel Ideology * Agency Direction
SupremeCourtPrecedent
SubstantialEvidence
FederalLaw
Intercept

aThe impact value displayed is the impact on the probabilityof agency success for a one-unit
change in the value of the variablein question comparedto a value of zero.
% categorizedcorrectly = 64.7%
Reductionof error = 18.7%
-2 LLR = 950.775
Model chi-square = 45.975; df = 6; p < .0001
Gamma = 0.298

Number of cases = 733
*significantat .05
**significantat .01

for a decision by the court to supportthe position of the agency, given the presence of each of the other independentvariables. Since this coefficient is not
readily interpretable,we provide under the column labeled "impact"the estimated increase or decrease in the probabilityof a supportivedecision when the
variablein question is present.This estimate assumes that a supportivedecision
otherwise has a 50-50 chance of being made.7
At first glance, the data in Table 2 appearto suggest that the effect of judicial
preferenceson the chances for agency success in the courts of appealsmirrorthe
findings of Crowley (1987) and Sheehan (1990, 1992) in the Supreme Court.
Panels of liberaljudges are much more likely to uphold liberalthan conservative
agency decisions and conservativejudges favor conservativedecisions. For example, for a liberal agency decision that had a 50% chance of being supported
by a politically neutralpanel of judges, there would be an estimated88% chance
that a panel with three judges appointed by a liberal, ideologically conscious
president(e.g., Johnson)would supportthe agency. On the other hand,the same
decision would have only a 12% chance of supportif the judges were appointed
by a conservative president like Reagan. These results suggest that the policy
preferencesof the judges are strongly related to the probabilitythat the agency
will win in court.
7At any other value, the estimated impact depends on whetherthe coefficient is positive or negative. Only at .50 is it symmetricaland thus nonarbitrary.
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The studies of agency success in the Supreme Court assumed that a finding
that the probabilityof agency success was strongly correlatedwith the congruence (or lack of congruence)between the policy directionof the agency decision
and the policy preferencesof the justices meant that the legal model was irrelevant. In contrast, our model of appeals court decisions attemptedto measure
more directlywhetherlegal variablesmattered.Three variablesthat tapped various aspects of the legal model were included in the analysis. First, the legal
model led to the predictionthat the appeals court would be responsiveto trends
in Supreme Court policy. Specifically, we hypothesized that the probability of
success in the SupremeCourtfor the agency,based upon the directionalityof the
agency's decision, would influencethe voting behaviorof the circuitjudges. The
variableSupreme Court Precedent was in the correct direction and statistically
significant,providing supportfor our hypothesis. That is, as the SupremeCourt
became more conservative,the probabilitythat the courts of appeals would support a conservative agency decision increased. For example, using the value of
the impact measure reported in Table 2, we can predict that a conservative
agency decision that had a 50% chance of being supportedby the courts of appeals in 1970 would have a 66% chance of supportby the same panel of judges
in 1980 when the SupremeCourthad become considerablymore conservative.
The second predictionderived from the legal model was that agencies would
have a greaterchance of success when the appeals court applied the substantial
evidence doctrine.The data in Table2 indicatethat the expectationof success in
substantial evidence cases received strong support. An agency decision that
would otherwise have a 50% chance of support would have a 61% chance of
supportif the substantialevidence doctrinewas applied. In addition,the expectation that agencies would be less successful in cases raising challenges to a
federal law was also confirmedin the model.
In summary,the predictionsthat were derived from the legal model received
substantialsupportin the data.All of the relationshipswere in the predicteddirection, were statisticallysignificant,and the magnitudeof the effects appearsto
be substantial.
Conclusions
The data in this study demonstratethat while administrativeagencies do not
enjoy as high a level of success in the courts of appealsas in the SupremeCourt,
they are still successful in over half the cases in which they appear.
The findings suggest that agency success in the appeals courts, as in the
SupremeCourt,is stronglyrelatedto political considerations.Judges at both levels are much more likely to upholdthe exercise of discretionby the agency when
the policy implicationsof that exercise are consistentwith the policy preferences
of the judges. However,it would be a mistake to view judicial review of agency
decisions as a purely political exercise. The judges do not appear to simply
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substitutetheir own policy preferencesfor those of the administratorswithout regard for law. Variables that captured elements of the legal model were also
related to judicial decisions to a statistically significant degree. Takentogether,
the evidence suggests thatthe appealscourts appearto respondto both legal concerns and political preferences. Thus, while it would be naive to believe that
politics is irrelevantin judicial review of agencies, it appearsthat the courts do
fulfill, at least in part, the normative expectations that they will constrain the
worst abuses of discretionby administratorsby imposing the rule of law. We believe that the most reasonable explanationof the findings is that the courts of
appeals are staffed with judges who are policy oriented and attempt to bring
agency policy into line with their own policy preferencesbut feel constrainedto
pursue their preferenceswithin limits set by the law. Put slightly differently,the
courts are responsive to the law even though the law does not always dictate an
unambiguousresolution of every case. As a result, when SupremeCourtprecedent becomes more conservative,the courts of appeals adjusttheir own patterns
of decision making. Liberal panels still attemptto find ways to achieve liberal
outcomes, but will feel their discretionto achieve those ends to be more limited.
Thus, as SupremeCourt precedent shifts in a conservativedirection, it appears
that the decision patternsof both conservative and liberal appeals court panels
will become more conservative,even though the probabilityof a liberal decision
will remaingreaterif the panel is composed of liberaljudges.
Since several studies noted above suggest that in the SupremeCourt, the nature of the agency may affect the probabilityof agency success in the courts, we
ran additionalmodels controlling for agency type (both economic/social and independent/executive).We found that these control variables did not have a
significant impact on the strength of our existing variables. Furthermore,the
model was not significantlyimprovedby the additionof these variables,and neither variablewas statisticallysignificant.We think this is an interestingsidelight
of our model since studies on the SupremeCourt found agency types to be significant. When we ran a model with only the agency type variables, we found
that the economic/social dichotomy was significant,but the independent/executive was not. These findings suggest that once controls are introducedfor both
legal constraintsand the policy implicationsof the decisions, agency type per se
appearsto be irrelevant.
The measuresemployed of both political preferencesand legal constraintsare
admittedlyrough.The most likely result of the use of such rough indicatorsis an
increase in randomerror,and this may account for the substantialamountof unexplained variance in the model. Futureresearch should strive to develop more
precise indicators.In particular,we were only able to develop indirectindicators
of legal effects. Insteadof directlymeasuringthe degree to which precedentin a
given case supporteda decision to uphold agency discretion,we were only able
to make predictionsfrom rough indicatorsof issues about the patternof results
that could be expected if the legal model were valid. The supportof these pre-
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dictions certainlyis consistentwith the hypothesisthat law matters,but futureresearch can hopefully producemore direct measures of the impact of precedent.
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